In a general equilibrium model with a continuum of traders and bounded aggregate endowment, we investigate the Market Selection Hypothesis that markets favor traders with accurate beliefs. Contrary to known results for economies with (only) finitely many traders, we find that risk attitudes affect traders' survival and that markets can favor "lucky" traders with incorrect beliefs over accurate traders. Our model allows for a clear distinction between accuracy and luck and shows that market selection forces can induce efficient prices even when accurate traders do not survive in the long-run.
Introduction
According to the market selection hypothesis, MSH henceforth, the market rewards the traders with the most accurate beliefs. This hypothesis, first articulated by Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) , is one of the key arguments supporting financial markets' fairness and efficiency. Under the MSH, markets are fair, in the sense that accurate traders are rewarded and lucky fools will not prosper forever; and markets are efficient because, in the long run, it is the accurate traders who control most of the wealth and determine asset prices. These two implications of the MSH play an essential role in most neoclassical models of financial markets which either assume that private information is valuable (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) ) or that markets are efficient (e.g. Lucas Jr (1978) ).
Since Milton Friedman's work, efficiency and fairness have been considered, for the most part, to be the same. Either we have models in which inaccurate traders vanish and do not affect prices (Sandroni (2000) , Blume and Easley (2006) ) or models in which inaccurate traders survive and affect prices (e.g., De Long et al. (1991) , Blume and Easley (1992) , Yan (2008) ) and Borovička (2013) ). However, fairness and efficiency are not equivalent concepts. Kogan et al. (2006) demonstrate that market fairness is not sufficient for market efficiency. They show that inaccurate traders can have a significant impact on prices even if their consumption-shares become negligible.
In our paper, we prove that market fairness is not even necessary for its efficiency.
We show that asymptotic prices of short-lived assets can reflect accurate beliefs even if the selection forces make accurate traders lose all their wealth. In these cases, traders with correct beliefs vanish for sure and luck is the only determinant of traders' survival.
Our model generalizes the standard setting of Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) , small economies henceforth. We maintain all of their assumptions, but allow for a continuum of heterogeneous beliefs' traders, large economies henceforth.
This mild generalization suffices to change some of the main implications of their model. Although in both settings, markets are asymptotically efficient, only in the large, do luck and risk attitudes play a role on traders' survival and the MSH can fail.
There are three reasons to focus on large economies. First, by allowing for luck, large economies offer a more realistic description of real markets. Luck plays no role in small economies (only) because traders are assumed to live forever, however, in real markets traders invest over a finite horizon, and luck cannot be ruled out. Second, (only) large economies are consistent with the competitiveness of Walrasian equilibrium. As argued in Aumann (1964) , only atomless traders can believe rationally that their choices do not affect equilibrium prices. 1 Third, small economies are special cases of large economies.
Focusing on the large comports no loss of generality and enriches our understanding of the selection mechanism.
We begin our paper by presenting an example in which the market selects against all the traders with correct beliefs, luck is the only determinant of traders' survival, and asymptotic equilibrium prices reflect accurate beliefs. In the rest of the paper, we develop the formal theory needed to discuss selection in large economies and to understand the example. In the tradition of the selection literature, we propose a survival index and use it to derive a sufficient condition for a (positive mass of) traders to vanish that applies to both small and large economies.
Our index generalizes those found in the existing literature by including a term that captures the effect of risk attitudes on the aggregate saving incentives of a positive mass of trader. To lower value of the CRRA parameter it corresponds higher propensity to transfer consumption to the future, thus higher aggregate inter-temporal discount factor and higher survival chance. 2 This new term highlights that small and large economies are qualitatively different: only in the large, risk attitudes do play a role on traders' survival. In Section 5.5, we reconcile the different role played by risk attitudes in the two settings.
1 The standard justification for the competitiveness of the Walrasian equilibrium in small economies is to argue that each trader represents a continuum of identical traders. We find this argument unsatisfactory because it demands an unrealistic amount of homogeneity among traders' beliefs.
2 The effect of risk attitudes on traders' survival we identify is in the same direction as the one described by Yan (2008) for small growing economies. However, the magnitude of our effect is smaller and it cannot be attributed to the fact that the economy is growing.
A precise definition of luck 2.1 Probabilistic environment
The model is an infinite horizon Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with complete markets for a unique perishable consumption good. Time is discrete and begins at date 0. At each date, the economy can be in S mutually exclusive states: S = {1, ..., S}, with cartesian product S t = × t S. The set of all infinite sequences of states, paths, is S ∞ = × ∞ S, with representative path, σ = (σ 1 , ...). σ t = (σ 1 , ..., σ t ) denotes the partial history till period t, C(σ t ) the cylinder set with base σ t , C(σ t ) = {σ ∈ S ∞ |σ = (σ t , . . .)}, Σ t the σ-algebra generated by the cylinders, Σ t = σ C(σ t ), ∀σ t ∈ S t } , and Σ the σ-algebra generated by their union, Σ = σ ∪ t Σ t . By construction {Σ t } is a
filtration. In what follows we introduce a number of economic variables, which depends on σ t , these variables are assumed to be date t measurable according to Σ t .
The true probability measure on Σ is P , while each trader has a subjective, possibly incorrect, probabilistic view p i on Σ. Following the tradition in the market selection literature, we assume traders' beliefs to be dogmatic: traders "agree to disagree" and trade for speculative reasons. For any probability measure p i , p i (σ t ) is the marginal
With an abuse of notation, p i (σ t ) also indicates the likelihood of p i on σ t . For example, if p i is Bernoulli with p i (σ t = 1) = i, then p i (σ t ) = i t 1 (1 − i) t 0 , where t 1 and t 0 denote, respectively, the number of realizations of state 1 and of state 0 on σ t .
Beliefs accuracy and luck
We propose two distinct notions of accuracy. Our definitions pertains the likelihood of traders' beliefs 3 and relies on the categorization of knowledge proposed by Kant (1781) . In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant proposes the following categorization:
3 Focusing on beliefs' likelihood is in the tradition of the selection literature; however, unlike Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) , we cannot rely on approximate measures of it. Our result captures O (log t) differences between traders' log likelihood. Sandroni's definition (average accuracy) is to coarse to capture these differences because the averaging factor, 1 t , dominates this rate; and Blume-Easley's definition can lead to incorrect results when describing such small differences (see Massari (2013) and Massari (2015) . a priori knowledge: knowledge that is independent of experiences; and a posteriori (or empirical) knowledge: knowledge that depends on empirical evidence. Our first definition of accuracy is a priori, it is a statement about the theoretical accuracy of traders' beliefs; our second definition of accuracy is a posteriori, it solely depends on empirical evidence. Definition 1. A priori accuracy: trader i is a priori accurate if 4
A priori accuracy is an ex-ante notion of accuracy. The real probability is used to define the theoretical set of sequences on which the likelihood ratio condition between p i and P must hold. Empirical evidence is not considered. 5
Definition 2. Empirical accuracy: trader i is empirically accurate on σ if
Empirical accuracy is an ex-post notion of accuracy. The real probability does not play any role on the determination of the sequence on which the likelihood ratio condition between p i and P must hold.
The possibility of a difference between a priori and a posteriori accuracy motivates our definition of luck. A trader is lucky if he is empirically accurate without being a priori accurate. That is, if he has incorrect beliefs, but on the realized path he is at least as accurate as a trader with correct beliefs.
Definition 3. Trader i is lucky on σ if he is empirically accurate on σ without being a priori accurate:
4 WLOG, we assume that lim
P (σ t ) exists P -a.s.. 5 A priori accuracy is weaker than the requirement that trader i knows exactly the real distribution, but it is stronger than the requirement that traders' beliefs produce next period forecasts that are asymptotically correct. For example Bayesian whose prior distribution attaches positive mass to model P is a priori accurate, while a Bayesian whose prior attach infinitesimal mass to P is not a priori accurate.
For example, suppose we toss a fair coin and that trader i incorrectly believes the probability of Head to be 1 3 . Trader i is not a priori accurate. On sequences in which the frequency of Head is 1 2 trade i is not empirically accurate. But, on sequences in which the frequency of Head is 1 3 , trader i is empirically accurate, thus lucky. Although a priori accuracy and empirical accuracy are not immediately comparable, the two definitions hardly disagree in practice. By definition, an a priori accurate trader is empirically accurate; conversely, by the Strong Law of Large Numbers, the set of sequences in which an empirically accurate trader is also a priori accurate has measure one. This P -a.s. equivalence is strong enough to rule out luck in economies with finitely many traders. However, it is not strong enough to rule out luck in large economies. There are large economies in which, although no individual trader has positive probability to be lucky, the probability of observing a lucky trader is one. For these economies, we prove that it is traders' risk attitudes that determine the type of accuracy rewarded by the market: if traders are less risk-averse than log, the market rewards traders for being empirically accurate (luck), otherwise, it rewards traders for being a priori accurate.
The following example illustrates a simple setting in which the probability of observing a lucky trader is one. 6
Example: Suppose we toss a fair coin t times and that we have 2 t traders. Each trader believes that the coin will deliver a distinct deterministic sequence of length t. Because the number of possible sequences (2 t ) and the number of traders coincide, to every sequence, σ t , it corresponds a trader who believes that σ t will occur for sure. That is, for everyσ t we have a (lucky) trader,î(σ t ), for which the probability of obtaining a favorable realization is extremely low, P σ t ∈ S t : pî(σ t ) P (σ t ) > 0 = 1 2 t ; but whose beliefs attach more likelihood toσ t than the real probability does, pî(σ t ) P (σ t ) = 2 t . With t = ∞, this belief structure illustrate a case in which we have a lucky trader in every sequence.
6 Although our result relies on a similar intuition, common sense -we do not have that many traders in the market-and technical reasons -to ensure existence of the competitive equilibrium we need the number of beliefs to be order of magnitudes smaller than the number of sequences (see Ostroy (1984) )-makes it impossible to directly apply this belief structure. The beliefs' structure we adopt, instead of requiring a trader per sequence (a number that grows exponentially in t), only needs a trader per frequency (a number that grows polynomially in t).
The leading example
Consider an Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with a single, persishable consumption good, complete markets, no aggregate risk, discrete time and two states S = {W, R}.
There are two sets of traders with positive mass (clusters): A γ U and A γ S . Individual traders, i, can have different beliefs, p i , but share identical CRRA utility function (u i (c) = c 1−γ −1 1−γ ) with parameter γ < 1 and discount factor β. As usual, every individual trader in the economy aims to solve:
Where E p i is the expectation according to trader i's beliefs, c i t (σ), e i (σ t ), and q t (σ) are trader i's consumption, his endowment and equilibrium prices (of a unit of consumption) in period t on the sequence of realizations σ, respectively.
s period t aggregate consumption on path σ. In the tradition of the selection literature, the asymptotic fate of a cluster is coarsely characterized by the distinction between those clusters who disappear and those who do not.
The real probability of the states evolves according to the following (Polya urn) process, P P olya . The process starts with an urn containing one White ball (W ) and one Red ball (R). At the beginning of each period, we randomly select a ball from the urn to determine the state of the economy. The selected ball is then returned to the urn along with one new ball of the same color. 7
Traders in A γ S , skilled traders, share correct beliefs, ∀i ∈ A γ S , p i = P P olya . They represent a group of traders with insight information: before every draw, they are allowed to observe the composition of the urn.
Traders in A γ U , unskilled trader, have heterogeneous iid belief about the probability of R. The union of their beliefs covers the simplex so that, with an abuse of notation, A γ U = {i ∈ (0, 1)} where i denotes both trader i and his iid beliefs: ∀t, ∀i, p i (R t ) = i.
The unskilled cluster collects the different opinions of those traders who, not having access to private information, never change their beliefs. Because the composition of the urn changes over time, P P olya is not iid and all traders in A γ U have incorrect beliefs.
Traders' first-order conditions of the maximization problem are sufficient for the Pareto Optimum and, in every path σ t , can be expressed as
, where p i (σ t ) is the probability attached by trader i to path σ t and c i 0 is his time 0 consumption. Rearranging and (Riemann) summing over traders of the same cluster,
Exponentiating by γ and taking the ratio of clusters' aggregate consumption,
In Appendix A we prove that Equation 1 converges to 0 with probability arbitrarily close to 1. That is, skilled traders vanish 8 and the MSH fails.
Discussion
This example can be fairly surprising at first glance. All the skilled traders have correct beliefs, all the unskilled traders have incorrect beliefs and yet skilled traders vanish. In this section, we give an informal preview of the results. These intuitions are demonstrated and further discussed in the remainder of the paper.
8 Because the aggregate endowment is bounded 
The numerator is proportional to the real probability of σ t . The denominator has an aggregate probability term, P P olya (σ t ), which coincides with the real probability of σ t , and an aggregate discount factor term, e 1−γ 2 ln t , which is a function of the difference between cluster A U 's dimensionality (one because of the bijection between A U and (0,1)) and its CRRA parameter. The comparison of the probability terms of the two clusters, reveals that a wisdom of the crowd effect has emerged. Although no unskilled trader has the correct beliefs, unskilled traders collectively behave as if they had correct beliefs. However, the two clusters do not have equivalent investment strategies because risk attitudes affect unskilled traders' aggregate discount factor. Equation 2 shows that to lower (higher) values of γ correspond higher (lower) propensity toward future consumption, thus higher (lower) saving rate. The unskilled cluster dominates because its aggregate beliefs are, in every sequence, empirically accurate and it saves more than the skilled cluster.
Who dominates?
Equation 2 shows that both clusters have equivalent aggregate beliefs and that clusters' selection solely depends on the effect of unskilled traders' risk attitudes on their aggregate discount factor. However, it is not informative enough to indicate how consumption-shares are eventually distributed among unskilled traders. In Section 5.3
we demonstrate that, within members of the unskilled cluster that dominates, the selection forces select for lucky traders. That is, those traders whose iid beliefs coincide with the empirical frequency of R. The intuition goes as follows.
By Lemma 3, ∀σ, ∀t, P P olya (σ t ) = 1 0 p i (σ t )di. Therefore, the Polya urn process produces probabilities that are equivalent, in distribution, to the probabilities obtained via this two step process. In the first step, Nature randomizes according to a Uniform distribution on (0,1) to decide the probability of Red: p(R). In the second step, Nature uses p(R) to generate an iid sequence of length t. Skilled traders are a priori accurate because they know that Nature is choosing p(R) at random according to a Uniform distribution (lim t→∞ P P olya (σ t ) P P olya (σ t ) = 1 P P olya -a.s.). Each unskilled trader is not a priori accurate because he believes that there is a unique possible probability p i (R) = i and, according to the randomization performed by Nature in the first step, each i ∈ (0, 1) has 0 probability to be the realized value of p(R)
P P olya (σ t ) = 0 P P olya -a.s.). However, although no unskilled trader has positive probability to have correct beliefs, the beliefs of the unskilled traders collectively covers the entire simplex. Thus, for every possible realization of p(R), there must be a lucky, unskilled traderî whose belief coincides with p(R). Among unskilled traders, the market selects forî because, conditional on p(R) =î,î is the only empirically accurate trader in the economy. 9
Do markets become asymptotically efficient?
Markets do become asymptotically efficient: the asymptotic equilibrium prices of the short-lived asset in a large homogeneous discount factor economy reflect accurate beliefs even when the market selects against accurate traders (Section 6). The intuition behind the result is the following. By standard economic arguments, as the consumptionshares of the lucky traders approaches one, the equilibrium prices of the short-lived asset converge to their discounted beliefs. The result follows by noticing that, as the number of trading periods increases, the number of balls in the urn also increases, making the composition of the urn more stable. Asymptotically, the effect of one extra ball per period becomes negligible, and the Polya urn process is indistinguishable from iid extractions from an urn whose composition coincides with the empirical frequency (i.e., the beliefs of the lucky trader).
The formal model 4.1 The traders in the economy
In this Section, we formally describe the space of traders and provide conditions under which aggregation is not problematic.
The measure space of traders is (A, A, i), where A is the unit interval, A its Borel subsets, and i is the Lebesgue measure. The economy is characterized by the aggregate preferences γ j and by the aggregate time 0 consumption C j 0 of N measurable sets of traders A γ j , j = 1, ..., N . γ j and C j 0 are constructed, respectively, by aggregating the preferences and the initial consumptions of a positive mass of atomless traders i with beliefs p i , utilities u i , endowment process e i (σ t ), and infinitesimal time 0 consumption
With an abuse of notation, A γ j is used to represent a set of traders A γ j = {i ∈ A γ j }, a set of probabilities, traders' beliefs A γ j = {p i : i ∈ A γ j }, and the set of parameters describing traders beliefs A γ j = {i ∈ Θ γ j }. For example, if all traders in A γ j have
Bernoulli beliefs and the union of their beliefs covers the simplex, A γ j indicates at the same time {i ∈ A γ j }, {p i : i ∈ A γ j } and {i ∈ (0, 1)}.
Definition 5. A cluster, A γ j , is a measurable subset of A such that
• cluster A γ j has strictly positive time 0 consumption:
• traders in A γ j have identical CRRA utility function u(c) =
and identical discount factor β j ∈ (0, 1);
• either traders in A γ j have identical beliefs, or Θ γ j is an open subset of a member of the exponential family. 10,11
The definition of a cluster ensures tractable aggregate investment strategies for sets of traders with positive aggregate time 0 consumption. Homogeneity of preferences and discount factors allows to represent cluster's optimal consumption choices as a function of its discount factor, risk attitudes, and aggregate beliefs. The last condition ensures tractability of aggregate beliefs as it provides enough structure to obtain an asymptotic approximation of cluster's aggregate risk-adjusted beliefs. If all traders in a cluster have identical beliefs, that cluster can be equivalently considered to be a single trader with positive mass. That is, a large economy in which all clusters consists of identical traders is equivalent to a small economy.
Finally, this definition will play a crucial role in our condition for a cluster to vanish.
Definition 6. Given a path σ, pî
γ j is the empirically most accurate trader in A γ j if:
The assumptions
Throughout the paper, we refer to these assumptions:
A1: All traders have CRRA utility functions ∀i ∈ A, u i (c) =
The aggregate endowment is, in every period, strictly positive and bounded above.
A3: For all traders h, i, all dates t and all paths
0 is a continuous, strictly positive, integrable function of i. 12
10 The exponential family restriction is mild (e.g. Bernoulli, Multinomial, Geometric distributions and many others) and allows for both iid and non-iid models (e.g. Markov models with finitely many lags).
11 The case of Bayesian traders with identical support but different priors is discussed in Appendix C. 12 In this economy, the second welfare theorem applies. We make direct assumptions on the initial consumption shares, an endogenous variable, with the understanding that these assumptions are about the Assumptions A1-A3 are standard in the selection literature. If the traders in the economy can be organized into finitely many clusters with identical beliefs, the economy is formally equivalent to a small economy and Assumptions A1-A3 are implied by Sandroni's (2000) and Blume-Easley's (2006) one. Assumption A4 is a smoothness assumption needed for technical reasons. It comports almost no loss of generality: if c 0 were not continuous, we could get rid of the jumps by creating a new cluster.
As usual, a competitive equilibrium is a sequence of state prices {q t (σ)} ∞ t=0 and, for each cluster A γ j , a sequence of consumption choices {C j t (σ)} ∞ t=0 that is affordable, preference maximal on the budget set, and mutually feasible. Assuming that traders cannot short-sale (Araujo and Sandroni (1999) ), the existence of the competitive equilibrium follows from Ostroy (1984) existence theorem. We omit the proof because it is notationally intensive and tangent to the main contribution of our paper.
The reference economy
In this Section, we introduce the reference economy and a series of technical results.
We show that risk attitudes affect clusters' survival through its effect on the aggregate saving rate of clusters with heterogeneous beliefs. Lemma 2 quantifies this effect and relates it to the beliefs space's dimensionality of each cluster.
The economy is a discrete time Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with complete markets, bounded aggregate endowment, S states, and N clusters A γ j ,j = 1, ..., N .
Every individual trader in the economy aims to solve:
The true probability, P , is, for now, left unspecified.
Traders' first-order conditions of the maximization problem are sufficient for the Pareto Optimum and, in every path σ t , can be expressed as c i t (σ)
Rearranging and (Riemann) summing over traders of the same cluster, Aγ j c i t (σ)di = pareto weight distribution of the social planner problem in the background of the competitive equilibrium.
. Exponentiating both sides by the CRRA parameter and taking ratio of clusters' risk-adjusted consumption, prices simplify out:
The following Lemma uses standard arguments in the selection literature to show that Equation 3 is the fundamental quantity to determine which cluster vanishes.
Lemma 1 demonstrates that it is the ratio of risk-adjusted aggregate beliefs, instead of the ratio of aggregate beliefs', what determines clusters' survival. The distinction between risk-adjusted and not risk-adjusted aggregate beliefs is nihil in small economies because, for clusters with homogeneous beliefs, the common belief can be factored out of the integral.
Technical contribution
Our main technical contribution is to provide an approximation of risk-adjusted aggregate beliefs and to show that the distinction between risk-adjusted and not riskadjusted aggregate beliefs does play a role in large economies. Our approximation can be seen as a generalization of a fundamental result about Bayesian accuracy, the BIC approximation (Schwarz (1978) , Clarke and Barron (1990) , Ploberger and Phillips (2003) , Grünwald (2007) ).
Importantly, the BIC and our approximations do not depend on the real data generating process. They are valid, more generally, on every path in which the maximum likelihood parameter exists and lies in the strict interior of the prior support. We denote the set of all such sequences byŜ. 13
Definition 7.Ŝ is the set of sequences such that, for every cluster in the economy,
γ j exists and is strictly bounded away from the boundary of the simplex.
BIC approximation. Let M be a member of the exponential family and p B (σ t ) be the Bayesian likelihood obtained from a regular 14 prior distribution g on a k BICdimensional non-empty open subset, Θ 0 , of the parameter space Θ of M, then: 15
The BIC approximation shows that the likelihood of the probabilities obtained via
Bayes' rule depends on the dimensionality of the prior support (i.e., on the number of parameters that need to be learned). It formalizes the intuition that there is a likelihood cost in using models with redundant parameters because some of the information of the sample is "wasted" on learning that their real value is 0. 16
Lemma 2 obtains a similar approximation for risk-adjusted aggregate beliefs.
Lemma 2. Under A1-A4, cluster A γ j 's risk-adjusted aggregate beliefs satisfies:
is the dimensionality of A γ j (interpreted as a set of parameters).
13 In most non pathological cases,Ŝ can be thought of as being the set of all sequences. For example, in an economy with two states in which traders' beliefs are either iid or Bayesian,Ŝ is the set of all sequences whose frequency exists and is strictly bounded away from the boundary of the simplex.
14 A prior distribution is regular if it is continuous, strictly positive in the strict interior of the prior support. = 2). Since every iid model is also Markov 1, the next period forecasts of both traders converge to the true probability. Nevertheless, application of the BIC approximation reveals that B 1 's beliefs are empirically more accurate than B 2 's.
Proof. See Appendix B
When γ = 1 (log), Lemma 2 coincides with the BIC. However, for γ = 1 and k M AK > 0, Lemma 2 demonstrates that risk-adjusted aggregate probabilities are not mutually absolutely continuous with respect to their not risk-adjusted counterpart. In particular, for γ < η, Lemma 2 implies that the ratio of the γ-risk-adjusted aggregate beliefs and the η-risk-adjusted aggregate beliefs diverges in every sequence. In economic terms, cluster γ has higher discount factor than cluster η, thus it dominates.
In a small economy, all clusters have k M AK = 0. In this case, Lemma 2 implies that risk-adjusted probabilities are mutually absolutely continuous with their non riskadjusted counterpart and that risk attitudes have no effect on survival.
Main result
We are now ready to present a general condition for a cluster to vanish that only depends on exogenous quantities. In the tradition of the selection literature, we assign to every cluster a survival index. The asymptotic fate of each cluster can be determined by pairwise comparison of these indexes.
Definition 8. Cluster's A γ j survival index is
The survival index has four terms: The first three components are standard in the selection literature as they do not depend on the dimensionality of cluster's beliefs.
The last one is new and only appears in the large setting. Their interpretation goes as follows: t ln β j is the discount factor; more patient clusters have higher survival chances because attach higher value to future consumption. ln pî (σ t ) (σ t ) − Proof. Application of Lem.1 using Lem.2 and BIC to approximate the RHS of Eq.3.
Theorem 1 links cluster's survival to the four components of its survival index.
Keeping the other three components equal, differences in the first component indicate that the least patient cluster vanishes; differences in the second component indicate that a cluster vanishes if its empirically most accurate trader (parameter choice if it is a Bayesian cluster) is less accurate than the empirically most accurate trader (parameter choice) of another cluster; differences in the third component indicate that, given two Bayesian clusters whose support contains the true probability, the cluster that has to estimate more parameters vanishes (as for Blume and Easley (2006) , Theorem 6); and differences in the last component indicate that the cluster with the lowest γ j k term dominates because it saves more. These four components have different intensities. The first two components diverge at rate t, while the last two diverge at rate O(1) ln t. Thus, differences in the first two components always dominate differences in the other components. 17 Therefore, if all traders have an identical discount factor, the leading term of the survival indexes is the one capturing the empirical accuracy: the market selects for empirically accurate traders. For the cases in which there is more than one cluster with the most empirically accurate parameter-choice/trader, our condition highlights that risk attitudes can affect survival not only via direct comparison of the last term of the survival indexes (Section
5.1) but also via the interaction between its third and last components (Section 5.2).
This interaction can be responsible for failures of the MSH.
In the next sections, we discuss specific implications of Theorem 1. Because the first two components of the survival index are well understood (e.g. Sandroni (2000) 17 Differences in the second two components would become mute if we were to use an average measure of accuracy as in Sandroni (2000) (2006)), we focus on economies in which only the last two components differ; i.e., economies in which all clusters have homogeneous discount factor and the same empirically most accurate trader.
Definition 9. An economy is HDF if ∀i ∈ A, β i = β ∈ (0, 1)
The role of risk attitudes
To highlight the effect of risk attitudes on clusters' survival, we start with the simple case in which clusters differ only in their risk attitudes. Proposition 1. In a HDF-economy that satisfies A1-A4 with N clusters with identical beliefs sets with k M AK > 0, the least risk-averse cluster dominates onŜ. Because A γ and A η have identical beliefs set, example 1 highlights that risk attitudes affect clusters' survival through their effect on their aggregate saving rate. In the CRRA utility specification, the CRRA parameter captures both traders' attitudes toward risk and their attitudes toward inter-temporal consumption. In particular, if γ < η each trader in A γ optimally decides to postpone more consumption than the trader with the same beliefs in A η does. Thus, even if the two clusters have equivalent aggregate beliefs, A γ saves more and dominates.
Rearranging clusters' risk-adjusted beliefs, we can explicitly separate the beliefs' component from the discount factor component of clusters' optimal consumption plan: Corollary 1. Under A1-A4, cluster A γ j 's risk-adjusted aggregate beliefs satisfies:
Proof. See Appendix B.
The first component represents cluster's aggregate beliefs; the second, represents clusters' aggregate discount factor. It is interesting to note that, if the traders in A γ j have log-utility (γ j = 1), risk attitudes have no effect on the aggregate saving rate. This is because log-utility is the knife edge case in which the optimal investment rule of individual traders does not depend on equilibrium prices (the income effect, and the substitution effect cancel). Consistently with the result of Rubinstein (1974) , we find that a cluster of traders with log-utility and heterogeneous beliefs can be equivalently modeled as a unique trader with positive mass whose beliefs coincide with the consumption-share weighted average of the beliefs of the original cluster.
The role played by risk attitudes on aggregate saving can be intuitively understood by focusing on the recursive version of this competitive equilibrium. Because of the law of one price, in every period most unskilled traders subjectively believe that assets are mispriced and trade for speculative reasons. If traders have log utility (γ = 1), prices do not affect their optimal investment choices and aggregation does not affect cluster's aggregate saving rate (Rubinstein (1974) ). However, If γ < (>)1, the substitution effect if stronger (weaker) than the income effect and each member of the cluster trader optimally chose to invest more (less) aggressively than if they had log utility.
Because investing is the only way to save in this economy, this translates into a higher saving rate. 18
The role of heterogeneity of opinions
In the previous section, we found that for clusters with heterogeneous beliefs, risk attitudes interact with cluster dimensionality to determine the discount factor. Here we study the case in which the economy contains some clusters with heterogeneous beliefs and some clusters of identical Bayesian traders. We find that the effect of beliefs dimensionality and risk on clusters' discount factors (γ j k M AK j ) and the rate at which the Bayesian learns (k BIC j ) can offset each other.
Proposition 2. Given a HDF-economy that satisfies A1-A4, populated by two clusters:
A γ U , whose traders have heterogeneous beliefs; and A γ B , whose traders are Bayesian with identical, regular prior distribution on A γ U , then
Proof. Application of Theorem 1 by noticing that
Example 2: Consider an Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with two states S = {W, R}. There are two clusters, A γ U and A γ B , with identical risk attitudes γ and discount factor β. Traders in A γ U have heterogeneous Bernoulli beliefs p i such that 
.
The role of the real probability
In Proposition 2, we make a comparison between a cluster of Bayesian's traders and a cluster of traders with iid beliefs. The result holds in every path inŜ, thus it does not dependent on the real data generating process. If we assume that the real probability coincides with the beliefs of the Bayesian cluster, we have an economy in which all traders in A γ B have correct beliefs and yet for γ < 1 cluster A γ B vanishes: the MSH fails and luck is the sole determinant of traders' survival.
Proposition 3. Under the assumption of Proposition 2, if we further assume that P = p B and γ U < 1, then, with probability arbitrarily close to 1, the MSH fails and luck is the sole determinant of traders' survival.
But what does it mean that the real probability coincides with the probability obtained via Bayes' rule?
The Polya urn process in the leading example satisfies this requirement:
Lemma 3. The probability attached by the Polya urn process in the leading example, P P olya , coincides in every path with the probability obtained by Bayes' rule from a Uniform prior on the unit simplex of the Bernoulli family, p B :
Proof. See Appendix B Similar examples can be constructed as long as the real data generating process is exchangeable. I.e, whenever the real data generating process is such that the probability of a finite sequence of realization does not depend on the order of realizations.
Definition 10. An infinite sequence of realization σ ∞ is exchangeable if, for every finite t, P (σ 1 , ..., σ t ) = P (σ π(1) , ..., σ π(t) ) for any permutation π of the indices In the words of Kreps (1988): "...exchangeability is the same as 'independent and identically distributed with a prior unknown distribution function'...".
In the leading example, skilled traders have rational expectation because they know the "unknown" distribution function.
These observations can be used to construct other examples in which the MSH fails and luck is the sole determinant of traders' survival.
Example 3: Consider an Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with two states S = {W, R}. The true probability P evolves according to the following Polya urn process.
The process starts with an urn containing one White ball (W ) and one Red ball (R).
At the beginning of each period, we randomly select a ball from the urn to determine the state of the economy. The selected ball is then returned to the urn along with two new balls of the same color. There are two clusters, A γ U and A γ S , with identical discount factor β. Traders in A γ S , skilled traders, are Bayesian with Jeffrey's prior on Θ = (0, 1) (k BIC S = 1); by a similar argument as the one used in Lemma 3, P = p B .
Traders in A γ U , unskilled traders, have heterogeneous Markov 1 beliefs p i such that
Note that k M AK = 2 (the Markov 1 model has 2 parameters to be estimated: p(W |R) and p(R|R)) and that Θ ⊂ A γ U (the Bernoulli model is nested in the Markov 1 model). It is easy to verify that
, skilled traders vanish, the MSH fails and lucky traders dominates.
Necessary conditions for a violation of the MSH
We presented two examples in which the MSH fails. Both examples have three elements in common: a large number of traders, a mild level of risk aversion (CRRA utility less risk averse than log) and a data generating process such that the real maximum likelihood parameter is a random variable with continuum support. All these requirements are necessary for a violation of the MSH.
A large number of traders is necessary to mitigate the assumption that traders live forever and allow for luck to play a role on trader's survival. The intuition is that, although a single inaccurate trader is sure to eventually run out of luck ("Luck sometimes visits a fool, but it never sits down with him." German proverb), the situation is different if we consider a large number of traders (although nobody has a significant chance to win, someone always wins the lottery). More formally, a large number of traders is needed because if the economy had finitely many traders and a real data generating process whose maximum likelihood model is a random variable with continuum support, the probability of having a lucky trader is zero.
CRRA utilities that are less risk averse than log are also necessary to have a failure of the MSH. Proposition 2 demonstrates that heterogeneous clusters which are more risk averse than log save less than a cluster of traders with correct beliefs and vanish.
Finally, Proposition 4 demonstrates that the last requirement is also tight. Intuitively, the proposition shows that if the maximum likelihood parameters of the real data generating process are either constants or random variables with finite support, then the cluster with correct beliefs has maximal survival index (k BIC = 0 because the Lebesgue measure of the set of parameters is 0 and k M AK = 0 because all traders have identical (correct) beliefs).
Proposition 4. In a HDF-economy that satisfies A1-A4, if the parameters of the true data generating process are either deterministic or random variables with finite support, then a cluster whose traders have identical correct beliefs survives P -a.s..
Small and large economies
A large economy in which all clusters have traders with identical beliefs is formally equivalent to a small economy. In this case, the risk/dimensionality component is mute (k M AK =0) for every cluster and, consistently with Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) , we find that risk attitudes do not play a role in survival.
Proposition 5. In a small HDF-economy that satisfies A1-A4, ∀σ ∈Ŝ, the market selects for the most accurate trader.
Proof. By Theorem 1, noticing that in a small economy ∀ j=1,...,N , k
The different implications of risk attitudes on survival for large and small economies can be puzzling. Proposition 5 applies to economies with an arbitrarily large number of traders and yet is not valid in large economies. It turns out that this discontinuity is only apparent. If instead of focusing on vanishing Vs surviving (i.e., on the dichotomous distinction between zero Vs non-zero consumption-shares), we had focused on the size of the asymptotic consumption-shares, we would have found no discontinuity between the two settings. In small economies, risk attitudes affect asymptotic consumptionshares in the same direction as they do in large economies. The only difference is that this effect is weaker in the small and it does not bring the asymptotic consumptionshares all the way to 0 (1).
To illustrate this point, we present a small economy analog of Example 2. Although the CRRA parameter does not affect traders' survival, it affects the asymptotic consumption share of group of traders in a way that is consistent (in sign) with Proposition 2. The intensity of this effect is stronger in economies with many traders.
Example 4: Consider an Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with two states S = {W, R} and 2n traders. Traders 1,...,n have heterogeneous Bernoulli beliefs p i , cluster A γ U , 19 and traders n+1,...,2n are Bayesian traders, cluster A γ B , with Uniform prior
1 n p i (σ t ) . All traders share identical CRRA parameter γ and discount factor β. Assume that ∀i, c i 0 = 1 2n and that p 1 is the empirically most accurate trader. Rearranging the FOC as for Equation 3 and working through the notation, 20
Note how, if n is large and γ > (<)1, although no cluster vanishes, the Baysian cluster asymptotically consumes most (a small fraction) of the aggregate endowment.
The existing literature, by exclusively focusing on the dichotomous distinction between a trader that vanishes and one that survives have overlooked this effect of risk attitudes.
A possible intuition behind the result is the following. Initially, the consumption- ), the two measures are not mutually absolutely continuous and asymptotic consumption shares depends on γ, k BIC and k M AC .
The convergence occurs by definition: p 1 is the most accurate trader ⇔ ∀i = 1,
Markets are asymptotically efficient
If markets are fair, convergence to rational expectations follows from standard economic arguments. Our main contribution is to show that the selection forces induce efficient markets even when markets are not fair. This counter-intuitive result can be explained by noticing that, in a HDF economy, the second term of the survival index (the one capturing empirical accuracy) dominates the last two terms. By selecting for lucky traders, the market is selecting empirically accurate traders.
Proposition 6. In a HDF-economy that satisfies A1-A4 asymptotic prices of shortlived assets reflect the beliefs of the most accurate trader in the economy:
Where q(σ t+1 |σ t ) =
qt(σ) is the price to move a unit of consumption from date/event σ t to date event σ t+1 and ||.|| an arbitrary norm.
Proof. In a HDF economy, the leading factor in the survival indexes is the beliefs of the empirically most accurate trader in the economy,î(σ t ). By standard arguments, prices reflect discounted beliefs that become arbitrarily close to traderî(σ t )'s.
Conclusions
This paper extends the project started by Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) on market selection in general equilibrium complete markets to the large economy setting. This mild generalization is enough to modify some of the basic implications of their model. (Only) in large economies, risk attitudes do affect traders' survival and markets can select against traders with correct beliefs.
We provide a formal definition of luck. We demonstrate that there is a difference between being a priori accurate (skill) and being empirically accurate (luck) and that the type of accuracy rewarded by the market depends on traders' risk attitudes. When the market selects for luck over skills, we have a violation of the MSH that is qualitatively different from other cases found in previous literature: although the market selects against traders with correct beliefs, equilibrium prices of the short-lived assets are asymptotically accurate. Only in our case markets are unfair but efficient.
A Appendix: leading example
In this Appendix we provide a direct proof of a the violation of the MSH in the leading example.
This proof is a special case of the one provided in Appendix B. We believe it to be simpler to follow as it only relies upon algebraic arguments and it does not uses the equivalence between the Polya urn process and Bayesian updating from a Uniform prior we describe in Section 5.3.
Letî(σ t ) = 1 t t τ =1 I σt=R be the frequency of Red balls on σ t .
Lemma 4. Assume that c i 0 is constant on A γ U , then for all σ ∈Ŝ,
Proof.
by Lemmas 5 and 6.
Lemma 5. For the Polya urn process described, ∀σ ∈Ŝ,
a) It follows noticing that:
ii) by exchangeability, permutations of the indices do not change the probability of finite sequences, thus ∀σ t , P P olya (σ t ) = P P olya (σ t R ) where σ t is a generic sequence of length t witĥ i(σ t )t realizations of state R and σ t R is the sequence of length t in which state R appears only in the firstî(σ t )t entries: σ t R = {R 1 , ..., Rî (σ t )t , Wî (σ t )t+1 , ..., W t }; iii) applying formula i) to P P olya (σ t R ) it follows that:
c) Disregarding the finite constants.
Lemma 6. ∀σ ∈Ŝ,
expressing the Beta function as a ratio of Γ-functions
by definition, if the arguments of the Γ-functions are integers
(1−î(σ t ))t 1 γ 1 √ t using Sterlings approximation as in Lemma 5 a) Given the asymptotic nature of the approximation the integer assumption is done WLOG.
23 ∀t, the probability of Red is the fraction of Red balls in the urn:
; Numerator: the urn has 1 initial Red ball, plus a Red ball for every time a Red ball has been selected. Denominator: the urn has the 2 initial balls plus a ball for every extraction.
B Appendix: proof of the main results
We will make use of the notations o(.) and ≈ with the following meanings: f (x) = o(g(x)),
ln t . It follows from Lemma 8 by substituting A γj for A, multiplying by γ j , exponentiating and ignoring the constant terms.
The proof of Lemmas 7 and 8 follows the steps of Grünwald's (2007, pg. 248) proof of the BIC (if γ = 1 and c 0 is a density the two proofs coincide).
Lemma 7. Let M be a member of the exponential family parametrized by A and c i 0 a function that satisfies A4, then:
Where D(pî
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between pî
a: For example, if p i (σ t = 1) = i is Bernoulli, the result follows because:
Lemma 8. Let M be a member of the exponential family parametrized by A and c i 0 a function that satisfies A4, then, ∀σ ∈Ŝ,
Where I(pî
Focusing, WLOG 24 , on the case in which M is the Bernoulli family, so that p i = i. Let
2 +α ]} with 0 < α < 1 2 . To gain intuition, take α very small, so that B t is a neighborhood of the maximum likelihood that shrinks to 0 at rate slightly slower than By additivity of the integral:
The proof is done by performing a second-order Taylor expansion of D(pî 
for some i * ∈ B t such that i * lies between i andî. † First integral: ∃k, a < ∞ : I 1 = A\Bt e 
For the most part, Proposition 3 coincides with Proposition 2. We only need to show two additional things: a) the MSH fails with probability arbitrarily close to 1, i. The market selects for luck because:
• lim t→∞ B t (î) =î: the market rewards an empirically accurate trader.
• A lim t→∞ I Bt g i di = 0, traderî is not a priori accurate.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The proof follows by noticing that the composition of the Polya urn (i) and the conditional probabilities obtained via Bayes' rule from a uniform prior (ii) coincides in every path.
Let t R = t τ =0 I σt=R and p i (σ t ) = i t R (1 − i) t−t R .
• i) In every period, the real probability of selecting a Red ball is the fraction of Red balls in the urn: P (R t+1 |σ t ) = t R +1
t+2 .
-Numerator: the urn has 1 initial Red ball, plus a Red ball for every time a Red ball has been selected.
-Denominator: the urn has the 2 initial balls plus a ball for every extraction.
• ii) By the definition of conditional probability and of the Beta function,
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Let Aĵ be the cluster whose traders have identical correct beliefs.
Identical beliefs implies, k > −∞ P -a.s..
Aĵ survives P -a.s.. because it can be shown that the condition of Theorem 1 is also necessary when there is a trader in the economy that has correct beliefs.
C Appendix: heterogenous bayesian clusters
Our motivations for studying large economies was to depart from the strong homogeneity assumptions implicit in the small setting. It could be argued that requiring all Bayesian traders to share a common prior is inconsistent with the stated goal (unless p B = P ). We agree to this view and reassure the reader that this assumption can be abandoned.
